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Abstract 
 
While the causes of foreclosure are generally well understood, the outcomes of 
foreclosure have been poorly documented.  Although rare, home redemptions – 
when foreclosed homeowners retain their home after it has been sold in a 
foreclosure auction – are a possible outcome.  This paper explores the occurrence 
of foreclosure redemptions in Hennepin County, Minnesota in the year 2005, and 
examines how and why some homeowners were able to keep their house after 
being foreclosed upon.  Using GIS data from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s 
Office and County Assessor, this paper analyzes the likelihood and spatial 
patterns of redemption.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past five years, the many foreclosures that have occurred in the 
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul have devastated families and the 
neighborhoods in which they live.  During this period, government and non-
governmental institutions alike have tried nearly anything to keep troubled 
homeowners in their houses: grass-roots efforts to make homeowners aware of the 
dangers of foreclosure; counseling for troubled homeowners; legislation that 
attempts to end predatory lending; and prosecution of those lenders who made 
shady loans.    One potential method of saving homes that has been rarely utilized 
is the home redemption. 
 While foreclosure is often portrayed in the news as a single event, it is 
actually a process that plays out over several months.  Foreclosure is the legal 
process through which lenders try to recover the loan amounts that are owed to 
them (McDaniel 2008).  In Minnesota, a homeowner receives the notice of 
foreclosure 30 days after their first missed payment.  After the sixth missed 
payment – roughly 24 weeks after the first missed payment – a homeowner is 
notified that the home will be sold by the sheriff’s department in four weeks.  The 
sale is a public auction, where anyone may bid and buy the home.  The sheriff’s 
sale represents the last opportunity for the homeowner to bring their mortgage 
payments current, including the interest owed for missed payments.  After the 
auction, the mortgage is void, and the home has a new owner.  However, the 
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foreclosed homeowner has one last chance to keep his or her home: the 
redemption period.  During the redemption period, which lasts six months, the 
homeowner retains the right to stay in the home and can pay off all existing debts 
on the home. Along with the possibility to keep their home, the six months also 
provides homeowners with a transition period in which they can figure out where 
they are going to live once the redemption period is over and they are forced out 
of their home.  If the homeowner is unable to do pay all debts by the end of the 
six-month period, he or she must vacate the property (Minnesota Home 
Ownership Center 2008).  A home is considered redeemed if the foreclosed 
homeowner pays off all debts on their home during the redemption period and 
then retains ownership of the home. 
 Although the redemption period seems like an additional opportunity to 
keep their home for foreclosed homeowners, very few homeowners are actually 
able to redeem.  Because redemption only helps a tiny percentage of at-risk 
homeowners, it has not been thoroughly studied.  This paper examines 
redemption in Hennepin County, Minnesota in order to find out the extent and 
patterns of redeemed homes.  By looking at redemption from a geographical 
perspective, the research aims to understand how redemption affects 
neighborhoods and communities, as opposed to just individual homeowners.  
Creating stable neighborhoods in which homes are owned and occupied by 
residents with a long-term interest in the area is important to the viability of any 
urban area.  Redemption can be one tool of many to helps stabilize neighborhoods 
that have been devastated by foreclosures.  When this research began, little was 
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known about the percentage of homes that were redeemed, or what types of 
homeowners were most likely to redeem their houses.  This research aims to 
answer some fundamental questions:  How many people redeem their homes?  
What resources do they use?  Are there any significant spatial or demographic 
patterns within the set of redeemed homes? 
 While the number of redeemed homes is small, this research attempts to 
analyze the redemption period’s usefulness and to propose possible changes to the 
redemption period to help more distressed homeowners.  While the study’s results 
were complicated by data problems, the results do show that the redemption 
period can be a useful resource for a small group of foreclosed homeowners. 
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THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
 
 To study redemption, it is first necessary to understand the causes of the 
current foreclosure crisis.  During this time there has been a tremendous rise in 
the number of home foreclosures nationwide.  No geographic area or 
demographic group has been spared. There are two types of causes that can lead 
to a foreclosure. Foreclosures that occur due to the options theory result from a 
drop in value of the property below the loan debt of the homeowner.  The trigger 
event theory occurs when the homeowner experiences financial difficulties due to 
an event such as a job loss or divorce.  These two theories often interact with each 
other in individual cases (Grover et. al. 2007).  In addition to understanding what 
caused the current crisis, a general knowledge of the foreclosure process will 
allow the reader to better comprehend how the redemption period fits within the 
larger issue. 
 
Causes of the Current Crisis 
The current foreclosure crisis that has engulfed the American housing 
market stems from an evolution in mortgage lending that no one –  not financial 
institutions, not the government, and certainly not homeowners – fully 
anticipated.  Whereas once lending money to American homebuyers was “one of 
the least risky and most profitable businesses that a bank could engage in”, in 
only a few years the deregulated and money-hungry lending industry had turned 
the housing market on its head (Zandi 2008).  Between 1979 and 2006, the rate of 
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“seriously delinquent” loans – those that were 90 days or more past due in the 
process of foreclosure – had averaged 1.7%.  By mid-2008 this rate had reached 
4.5%, an increase of 164% (Mayer et. al 2008).  By the end of 2009, as many as 2 
million homes may face foreclosure, undermining economic and homeownership 
gains made in the past decade (McDaniel 2008).  There is no single reason or 
organization to blame for such a large catastrophe.  Instead, it was a complete 
failure of the lending system in America.  In the wake of the calamity, 
governments at all levels as well as community and non-governmental 
organizations are trying to ease the crisis by passing new legislation and taking 
legal action against dishonest lenders. 
 The expansion of “sub-prime” and “near-prime” loans, collectively called 
“non-prime” loans, is seen as a major reason for the current problems. Although 
the terms lack a strict definition, it is generally understood that these types of 
loans are riskier and are usually given to borrowers who do not have good credit 
histories (Mayer et. al 2008).  Since people who receive non-prime loans have a 
history of poor credit, they are less likely to be able to make the payments on their 
mortgage.  In the past, non-prime loans were extended only to homeowners who 
could not afford prime loans.  In these cases, a non-prime loan could be used to 
extend credit to a homeowner who had previously been unable to get a mortgage. 
 It is important to make a distinction between non-prime loans and 
predatory lending techniques that have frequently accompanied the use of non-
prime loans in the past few years.  Non-prime loans are not new, and are not 
necessarily bad when used with proper precautions.  However, the frequency and 
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haphazard manner in which non-prime loans have been used recently has led to an 
abnormally high number of foreclosures.  Non-prime loans should be used for a 
select group of people, and only in certain circumstances when it is the only way 
to extend credit to a potential homeowner (Zandi 2008).  While non-prime loans 
are inherently riskier, in the past there were still income checks to make sure that 
a homeowner could repay the loan.  When used responsibly, non-prime loans are 
an opportunity for more people to become homeowners. 
Unfortunately, recently non-prime loans have been coupled with predatory 
lending practices.  In addition to the inherently risky nature of making non-prime 
loans, many were also made without full documentation of the income of the 
recipient.  In 2005, 44% of sub-prime loans were made without full 
documentation of income, up from 26% in 2000 (Stein 2008).  By not fully 
documenting the income of those families that were receiving the loan, lenders 
fooled families into believing that they could afford these dangerous loans on 
their current income, when in many cases this was never possible.  Even worse, 
many loans were made with false documentation, in which a borrowers’ assets 
and income were exaggerated in order to qualify them for a loan that they 
otherwise would have been unable to receive (Bjorhus 2007).  These types of 
predatory lending schemes, which were practiced by many of the unregulated 
banking firms that made non-prime loans to low-income families, are the largest 
culprit for the high number of foreclosures that we are experiencing now. Many of 
the loans were made unlawfully by using deliberately misleading practices that 
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gave homeowners a false sense of hope that they would be able to pay back their 
loans, which they could not afford. 
A further tool used by lenders to induce homeowners to sign risky 
mortgages is an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), which has a fixed rate for the 
first few years before the interest rate and payments begin to rise.  These loans 
often start out with a low “teaser” rate, which makes homeowners believe that 
they can afford the mortgage.  However, once the real interest rate kicks in after 
two or three years, payments jump substantially, sometimes as much as double, 
and the homeowner often cannot afford to make their payments (Mayer et. al 
2008).  ARMs were endorsed by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
during the early part of the 2000s, who believed that since most people stayed in 
their home for less than a decade, they should not have to deal with added interest 
expenses that come with 30-year fixed-rate loans.  He believed most Americans 
would save money because they would sell their home before the highest rates 
came into effect.  However, even in safe financial times, ARMs have a 50% 
higher delinquency rate than fixed-rate loans (Zandi 2008).   
It also should be noted that these techniques, which often end in 
foreclosure, disproportionately affected racial minorities and low-income 
families.  These groups, which have been historically discriminated against in the 
housing market, were targeted for risky non-prime and ARM loans far more often 
than the average American (Gramlich 2007).  Additionally, while lenders are to 
blame for many foreclosures, homeowners are also responsible for their fair share.  
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Many homeowners knowingly took out risky loans, believing that they would be 
able to refinance at some point in the future before their payments got too high. 
 Despite the creation of a delicate situation with the introduction of so 
many risky loans into the mortgage market, a new method of financing home 
buying developed by Wall Street investors actually made it more difficult to 
recognize the danger of individual mortgages.  While mortgages had previously 
been simple transactions between lenders and borrowers, the creation of mortgage 
securities added an extra layer of risk and ambiguity to the transaction.  Instead of 
paying their monthly bill to the lender, a homeowner’s payment would go into a 
pool of mortgages that would then be apportioned to investors who had bought 
the security from the original lender.  By combining many risky mortgages into 
one security, the dangers was obscured and “the incentive for responsibility was 
undermined” (Zandi 2008).   
In addition to the lowered motivation to protect homeowners by making 
safer loans, lenders were actually rewarded if they made riskier loans which 
provided a higher investment return on their securities (Stein 2008).  
Securitization allowed for riskier loans to be made and also extended the amount 
of capital available to lending services to make more loans.  Now lenders could 
make loans, sell them to investors and use the profits to originate further loans 
(Zandi 2008).  The end result was a high quantity of bad loans being made to 
homeowners who could not afford them, with little regard for the future or well-
being of the homeowners. 
13 
 
 The number of foreclosures might have been limited had it not been for an 
increased push for citizens to realize the “American Dream” of homeownership.  
Although the largest gains in homeownership were made after World War II, a 
new boom occurred between 1994 and 2005, when nearly 12 million Americans 
became homeowners for the first time (Gramlich 2007).  Homeownership was 
encouraged both by the government and American culture, where owning your 
own home is a sign of financial success and stability.  During this time period, 
housing prices appreciated rapidly.  Families that had never owned a home before 
could justify buying one as a “can’t-miss” investment. In addition to buying first 
homes, baby boomers and upper-class members saw an opportunity to purchase a 
second home before housing prices got too high (Zandi 2008).  With what 
appeared to be a significant amount of incentive to buy, and to buy now, 
homebuyers did not hesitate to sign mortgages that appeared a little dangerous. 
Proper government regulation of the mortgage industry might have limited 
the severity of the current crisis.  However, in the rush to make homeownership a 
reality for all Americans and to stimulate the economy, government regulation of 
lending was relaxed.  Government officials, particularly the Federal Reserve 
under then Chairman Greenspan, provided little oversight of loans, claiming that 
they did not want to stop “the free flow of credit” that was making so much 
money for lenders and investors (Stein 2008).   The decline in governmental 
supervision of the lending market and elimination of certain constraints on lenders 
allowed the sub-prime market to flourish (Gramlich 2007).  There was a new 
belief that the free market would properly regulate itself, and that government 
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should move aside to avoid slowing down the process.  Investors believed that a 
new era had been reached, one in which “the ordinary rules of economics and 
finance no longer applied” (Zandi 2008).  In addition to a lack of government 
regulation, credit rating agencies that were supposed to grade securities based on 
their risk were handing out AAA scores (considered very safe) on securities that 
were in fact very risky.  These high scores occurred in large part because the 
credit rating agencies were being paid by the issuers of the securities, creating a 
significant conflict of interest (Stein 2008).  This conflict of interest of these 
credit rating agencies increased the danger of the investments rather than 
providing another check against wild investment.  
Although it may seem that this system was designed to create foreclosures, 
this is not true.  Lenders do not want foreclosures, nor do they want to own 
homes.  Few parties gain from the actual foreclosure itself.  The average cost of a 
foreclosure to the homeowner, lender, government and neighborhood is $78,000 
(McDaniel 2008).  Lenders want to collect the mortgage fees, for which they 
charge interest (Gessell 2007).  Since foreclosed property owners do not pay fees, 
they do not generate profit for the lenders (McDaniel 2008).  Many sub-prime 
brokers made their profits on upfront fees and costs that were due upon the 
signing of the mortgage.  Once these were signed and the original lenders had 
collected their upfront fees, they no longer wanted the responsibility of owning 
the mortgage and collecting payments, so they sold the collection rights to another 
company and were no longer involved in the process. 
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Distribution of Foreclosures 
There are several known demographic factors associated with 
homeowners and neighborhoods that are correlated with higher rates of 
foreclosure. The most accurate variable in predicting foreclosures is, not 
surprisingly, risky credit scores. In one study of the Twin Cities market, looking 
at the credit scores of a census tract could predict 77% of the tracts in the top 
quintile in terms of foreclosed homes.  Other factors that helped predict where 
foreclosures occur are: percent nonwhite, percent poor, percent low income, high 
prime denial rate and high subprime refinance.  All these factors predicted 
between 62% and 68% of tracts in the top quintile (Grover et. al. 2007).  Although 
these factors were based on foreclosure data from the year 2002, and included 
some census data from 1990, it is safe to assume that they still hold largely correct 
for the current analysis, which uses foreclosure data from 2005 and census data 
from 2000.  This is confirmed by a study conducted by Crump (2007) of the 
University of Minnesota, which concluded that the spatial distribution of 
foreclosures in 2005 remained similar to the distribution in 2002. 
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FORECLOSURES IN THE TWIN CITIES 
 
 The high foreclosure rates in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul 
have ravaged communities and cost local governments millions of dollars in fees 
and property taxes.  Minneapolis, located in Hennepin County, has suffered the 
worst of the foreclosure effects.  In 2007 and 2008, the city had a total 5,972 
foreclosed properties (City of Minneapolis 2008).  The largest concentrations 
occurred in the lower-income and heavily minority North Side, as well as pockets 
in central and south Minneapolis (Star Tribune 2008).  The high number of 
foreclosed homes and the economic and social disruption that accompanies 
foreclosures have drawn considerable political attention, including a 
congressional hearing of the Committee of Financial Services held in Minneapolis 
in the summer of 2007.  The hearing, attended by local representatives Keith 
Ellison of Minneapolis and Betty McCollum of St. Paul and members from both 
city’s governments, served as a stage for local government officials and 
homeowners to express their frustration and anger. 
 The massive number of foreclosures in the Twin Cities has had a 
“devastating impact” on neighborhoods and communities by driving down 
property values and attracting “crime and other illegal activities”, according to 
Representative Ellison (United States Congress 2007).  Foreclosed homes quickly 
become vacant, lowering property values.  In addition, vacant properties are 
targets for criminals who strip the home of its piping to sell for scrap.  The 
resulting loss of property value averages about $10,000 for houses adjacent or 
across from a vacant home (Hoppin 2007).   
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Along with vandalism and burglary, high foreclosure rates also are 
strongly correlated to high murder rates and other dangerous criminal activity.    
North Minneapolis had 28% of Hennepin County’s foreclosures and 58% of the 
City of Minneapolis’ foreclosures in 2005, and in 2007 had more murders than the 
rest of the city combined, despite the fact that the area represents only a small 
fraction of Minneapolis (United States Congress 2007).  The community has also 
seen an increase in arson in the past few years (Crump 2007).  There is also the 
additional theft and burglary of vacant homes, which attracts drug dealers and 
users (Louwagie and Howatt 2007).   
Along with the social effects of foreclosures in the Twin Cities, there is 
also a considerable economic strain placed on local governments and taxpayers.  
For example, the state has spent thousands of dollars in prosecuting fraudulent 
lenders that inflated clients’ assets in order to qualify them for risky loans 
(Bjorhus 2007).  These lenders have not been banks; instead they have been part 
of the unregulated industry (United States Congress 2007).  These lenders “have 
systematically stripped the wealth of vulnerable communities, leaving in their 
wake a trail of financial distress that will likely take years to recover from” 
(Crump 2007). 
 The process of removing wealth from homes begins with a rise in housing 
price which increased the homeowner’s potential equity in their house. 
Homeowners borrowed or refinanced their mortgages, often several times, against 
this new equity, taking out risky loans with the belief that their home’s value 
would continue to rise.  Each new mortgage or refinancing generated profits for 
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lenders in the form of origination fees, while also transferring equity from the 
homeowner to the lender.  When the price of the home dropped, the homeowner 
realized that he or she had little equity left in the house.  Unable to sell their 
homes to repay their loans, many homeowners were forced into foreclosure 
(Crump 2007).  With so much refinancing and often more than one mortgage on a 
home, a homeowner’s debt often exceeded the value of the home.  In the 2007 
study by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve on foreclosures in Hennepin and 
Ramsey Counties, this was the case in 80% of foreclosed homes (Grover et. al 
2007). 
 Foreclosed homes tend to be highly concentrated in neighborhoods, which 
magnifies the associated problems (United States Congress 2007).  On some 
blocks, nearly half of the homes have been recently foreclosed (Louwagie and 
Howatt 2007).  Foreclosures have led to disinvestment in many local 
neighborhoods, according to St. Paul Mayor Chris Coleman.  Since foreclosures 
tend to be geographically concentrated in certain neighborhoods, even 
homeowners who are not experiencing problems with their mortgage payments 
are affected; home values in the whole neighborhood decrease due to foreclosed 
homes, many of which become vacant (United States Congress 2007).  Those 
people willing to make investments in areas with high foreclosure rates often do 
not have the best interests of the community in mind.  Large numbers of vacant 
lots frequently lead to “flipping” schemes by developers, which in turn leads to 
gentrification that can drive out the neighborhood’s original residents (United 
States Congress 2007). 
19 
 
 Foreclosures in the Twin Cities have been found to be concentrated in 
several neighborhoods.  Rates within the core cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul 
were significantly higher than in the suburbs (Grover et. al. 2007).  In 
Minneapolis, the areas to the northwest and southeast of downtown experienced 
the highest number of foreclosures in the city.  As Councilwoman Barb Johnson 
of the Minneapolis City Council stated in her Congressional testimony, people in 
these areas of the city, which are some of the poorest neighborhoods in Hennepin 
County, “do not have big stock portfolios or cushy retirement systems; they only 
have their homes” (United States Congress 2007).  A foreclosure can lead to 
financial ruin for the homeowner.   
In addition to geographic conditions which increase the likelihood of 
foreclosure, there are also economic and demographic factors which are strong 
indicators of high foreclosure rates in the Twin Cities.  Most foreclosures that 
occur in the Twin Cities happen within three years of the loan origination, and 
around half involve loans with high interest rates.  Many of these high interest 
rate loans were originated by non-regulated lenders (Grover et. al. 2007).  In 
2005, one quarter of all loans (22,690 out of 90,476) that originated in Hennepin 
and Ramsey County were considered non-prime loans.  However, previous 
research indicates that as many as half of non-prime loan recipients could have 
qualified for prime loans with better interest rates and lower rates of delinquency. 
Instead borrowers were steered toward non-prime loans because they are more 
profitable for the lender (Crump 2007).   
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Racial and ethnic minorities were much more likely to receive these non-
prime loans.  While only 20.1% of loans originated to White borrowers were non-
prime, the percentage was considerably higher for every other sizable ethnic or 
racial group in the area: 59.7 % for African Americans; 48% for Hispanics; 43.6% 
for American Indians; and 35.9% for Asians (Crump 2007).  Clearly, lenders 
targeted minority groups for the riskiest mortgages.  Often borrowers spoke little 
or no English, and did not understand the risk they were undertaking when they 
signed a mortgage (Bjorhus 2007).  Groups that had been previously 
discriminated against, especially African Americans, could now receive home 
financing, but they paid the price with risky loans that had the potential to destroy 
families and neighborhoods (Crump 2007). 
 While neighborhoods with high minority populations tend to have a 
greater risk of high foreclosure rates, there are other factors that also indicate a 
neighborhood’s likelihood of foreclosures.  Education level is a particularly 
strong indicator: the more borrowers with high school and college diplomas, the 
lower the foreclosure rates.  Income is also a strong indicator, with higher-income 
households less likely to go into foreclosure.  The rate of unemployment of a 
neighborhood and the percent of young heads of household (below age 45) were 
indicators of high rates of foreclosure (Grover et. al. 2007). 
   
Government Response 
 There has been action at all levels of government in an attempt to limit the 
number and effects of foreclosures in Hennepin County.  Along with government 
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actions, there has also been a significant effort by non-governmental 
organizations.  The “Don’t Borrow Trouble” advertising campaign is a national 
effort to advise potential homeowners about the dangers of risky mortgages.  The 
Minnesota chapter was launched in 2003 and is funded by local governments, 
non-profit organizations and members of the lending and real estate industry 
(Don’t Borrow Trouble 2007).  Along with advertisements warning about the 
dangers of risky mortgages, the organization also provides educational materials 
to teach new homeowners what to look for and what to avoid; it also has a help 
line for homeowners if they need advice. 
 Minneapolis has received several loans totaling over $20 million to 
purchase and restore homes. Using eminent domain, the city has bought homes in 
the hardest hit neighborhoods and resold them to stable homeowners (United 
States Congress 2007).  In addition to using eminent domain, Minneapolis non-
profit Greater Metropolitan Housing Corporation has struck a deal with four 
major lenders that allows the group to buy back foreclosed houses for discounted 
prices.  Once the homes are purchased, they will be offered to the city 
government, other non-profits in the area and private developers with a track 
record of responsible development.  The project, which is the first of its kind in 
the country and is serving as a pilot for other cities, is occurring in Minneapolis 
because the city is ahead of the national curve in recognizing the problems 
associated with vacant homes, and is leading the way nationally in rehabilitating 
its hardest-hit areas (Brandt 2008a). 
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 The Minnesota State Legislature has worked to pass legislation that looks 
to eliminate future predatory lending and ensure that there is not another 
foreclosure explosion.  The first bill, known as Predatory Mortgage Lending 
Practices Prohibited, which was signed into law by the governor and went into 
effect on August 1, 2007, was a large-scale effort to eradicate predatory practices.  
Among the main provisions of the bill are: requiring the lender to verify the 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan; prohibition of refinancing unless there is a 
“reasonable and tangible” benefit to the borrower; prohibition of loans with a 
negative amortization; placing a 5% cap on fees involved with the origination of 
the loan; requiring that mortgage officials act in the “best interest” of the 
borrower (Minnesota State Legislature 2007a). 
 The second bill – known as Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices 
Prohibited,Criminal Penalties Prescribed and Remedies Provided – also went into 
effect on August 1, 2007 and builds upon the original legislation.  This bill 
provides that: no lender shall make misleading or false statements; no lender shall 
sell a borrower a non-prime loan without informing the lender that he or she 
qualifies for a better loan; no lender shall charge prepayment penalties.  It also 
establishes a borrower’s legal rights of action and defines and prohibits mortgage 
fraud (Minnesota State Legislature 2007b). 
 The federal government has also done its part by passing legislation that 
aids homeowners and local governments.  This was done primarily through the 
passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.  The law provides 
assistance to distressed lenders through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) by 
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offering them 30-year fixed-rate loans with affordable interest rates.  In return the 
homeowner will share future increases in home equity with the FHA (U.S. Senate 
2008).  The bill also allocates nearly $4 billion in grants to state and local 
governments to rehabilitate vacant and foreclosed properties (Govtrack 2008).  
Lenders must now disclose the maximum monthly payments possible under the 
loan.  Finally, the law also provides $150 million for foreclosure prevention 
counseling and $30 million is allocated to legal services and distressed borrowers 
(United States Senate 2008). 
 Recently, the city of Minneapolis has decided to use $5.6 million of its 
federally allocated money to purchase and rehabilitate or demolish over 600 
homes in the city.  This money will be split roughly evenly, with about $1.5 
million each for demolition, redevelopment and the purchasing of vacant lots.  In 
addition, another $500,000 will be used to help low-income residents buy 
properties that are currently foreclosed.  While the city is coping with the current 
surge of foreclosures, it also has the benefit of knowing that the number of 
foreclosures is actually on the decline, unlike the rest of Hennepin County (Brandt 
2008b).  The last five months of 2008 all had fewer foreclosures in the city 
compared to the same month in the previous year (City of Minneapolis 2008).  
Much of this is likely due to the fact that in many of the hardest-hit areas, there 
are simply no more homes to foreclose on. 
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WHY IS THERE A REDEMPTION PERIOD? 
 
 The redemption period gives foreclosed homeowners one last chance to 
pay off their debts and interest and keep their home.  In Minnesota, the period 
lasts six months, after which homeowners must vacate the property if they cannot 
pay their debts.  The concept of a redemption is nothing new; it first appeared in 
English law in the 1500s and has been in effect in the United States since the early 
1800s.  A redemption period helps to protect against the loss of subjective value, 
value that is not captured by the market when the property is resold, by allowing 
homeowners one final chance to keep their property and “effectively extending 
the terms of the mortgage” (Baker et. al 2008).  By protecting the subjective value 
of the homeowner, redemptions attempt to keep the property in the hands of the 
person to whom it is most valuable; it recognizes that some properties have a 
greater value to some individuals than to others.   
 While the concept of redemptions originated with the intent of protecting 
farmers from losing their land during periods of economic trouble, it has been 
extended to all properties.  However, as agriculture has become a smaller part of 
the economy, states have shortened or eliminated their redemption policies.  
Minnesota is currently one of only seventeen states with a redemption period, and 
it has shortened its own redemption period from twelve months during the Great 
Depression to six months now (Baker et. al 2008). The six-month redemption 
period currently serves as the last possible opportunity for property owners to pay 
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off their debt to creditors before they are forced to vacate the property (Minnesota 
Home Ownership Center 2008). 
 There has been very little previous research on the geographical patterns 
and impact of redemptions in urban areas, as most research has focused on the 
causes and effects of foreclosure rather than on the relatively small number of 
homeowners who have redeemed their property.  Therefore, I was unable to find 
research on redemption in a similar context as Hennepin County.  This meant that 
I had no prior knowledge about the likelihood of redemption or how demographic 
factors affect the chance of a redemption.   
 Encouraging redemption plays into a larger action being made by cities 
across the country to aid depressed areas that have been the hardest hit by 
foreclosures.  While there will undoubtedly be higher than average turnover in 
these areas, it is important to keep as much cohesion in neighborhoods devastated 
by foreclosures as possible.  Maintaining a familiar environment “contributes to 
the psychological well-being of residents” and gives them pride in the sense of 
place that is created in the neighborhood (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975).  
Educating homeowners on the different ways to keep their homes – one of which 
is redemption – will help to keep communities intact.  Just as redemption kept 
farmland in the hands of farmers to whom it was most valuable, it can do the 
same thing in urban areas by keeping foreclosed homeowners in their homes. 
 Neighborhoods that are clearly in decline are most in need of protection.  
If they are not turned around quickly, “it may be impossible to save them in the 
future” (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975).  Once a neighborhood passes a tipping 
26 
 
point, it ceases to become livable and alternatives such as large scale clearings 
become more economically viable.  In order to retain their current population and 
encourage in-migration, the quality of life in these devastated neighborhoods must 
be improved (Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975).  The best way to improve livability in 
a neighborhood is with homeowners who are invested in the neighborhood and 
concerned about its future.  A homeowner that has redeemed his or her house has 
just made a significant financial investment in the neighborhood and will desire 
that the neighborhood stay healthy in order to preserve the investment.   
Therefore, redemptions that occur in the hardest-hit neighborhoods are most 
important, because such redemptions will help prevent neighborhood decay. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 In order to study redemptions, it is first necessary to understand where 
foreclosures are taking place.  The year 2005 was chosen for study because it was 
the most recent dataset available in which the six month redemption period could 
be examined.  If data for the year 2006 had been chosen, the redemption period 
for some of the homes would not have been complete when this study began in 
May of 2007.  Only homes that had been auctioned off at the end of the 
foreclosure period by the county sheriff were considered in this study, since these 
homes were the ones that had entered the redemption period and therefore were 
eligible to be redeemed by their owners. Homes that had entered the foreclosure 
process but did not proceed as far as the sheriff’s sale were not considered in this 
research.  
The foreclosure data for 2005 were obtained from the Hennepin County 
Sheriff’s Office.   These data did not contain the addresses of the foreclosed 
homes; the addresses had to be matched to the legal descriptions of the homes.  
The addresses were then geocoded and made into a GIS shapefile by one of 
Professor Smith’s classes, allowing the data to be mapped.   The data contained 
the address, owner, date of the sheriff’s sale and mortgage lender for each 
foreclosed property.   The data are public and therefore were free.  The Sheriff’s 
Office reported a total of 1,680 foreclosure home sales during the year 2005.  
Figure 1 shows the location of foreclosure home sales in Hennepin County in 
2005.  As the map shows, foreclosures were most heavily concentrated in 
Northern Minneapolis (the communities of Near North and Camden), Central  
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Figure 1. Note: The black outline represents the boundaries of Minneapolis. 
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Minneapolis (the communities of Phillips and Powderhorn) and the northern 
suburbs of Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, Crystal and Robbinsdale.   This 
corroborates with earlier research on foreclosures that indicates that areas with 
high levels of low-income and minority residents are more susceptible to 
foreclosure (Grover et. al. 2007).  There were also high concentrations of 
foreclosures in wealthier cities such as Mound and St. Louis Park.  The 1,680 
foreclosures were spread fairly evenly across the four quarters of the year, with no 
quarter accounting for less than 23% of the total and no quarter accounting for 
more than 28% of the total. 
 In order to determine whether a home had been redeemed, the name of the 
original owner of the foreclosed home was compared to the owner of the property 
at least six months after the sheriff’s sale. A foreclosed home that had the same 
owner after the redemption period was complete would be considered redeemed.  
In order to make this comparison between homeowners of the foreclosed property 
and homeowners after the redemption period, I obtained parcel data for all of 
Hennepin County from the County Assessor’s Office, via the Metropolitan 
Council, which is a regional government agency in the seven-county Twin Cities 
Metropolitan Region.  These data show the address and owner of all properties 
within the county, as well as other basic information for each property. These data 
are provided by the Metropolitan Council to academic institutions in the area. 
The next step of the process was to use ARC GIS to match the names of 
the owners from the two data sets. When initially attempting to compare the 
names of the owners across the two datasets, I realized that minor differences in 
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the way a name was listed – for instance the use of a middle initial in one of the 
data sets and not the other – was causing problems.  If the names were not spelled 
the exact same way in both data sets, ARC GIS would not recognize that the 
home was still owned by the same person.  In order to fix this data entry problem, 
I had to manually inspect each owner name in the list of foreclosed properties to 
ensure that the spelling and structure of the names were the same as the spelling 
and structure of the names in the parcel dataset.  It is important to note that 
correcting the names did not compromise the accuracy of the data or the results of 
the research; the corrections were necessary in order to ensure accuracy when 
comparing the owners’ names from the list of foreclosed homes with the county 
parcel data.  Without correcting the formatting of the owner names, ARC GIS 
would have missed several homes that had been redeemed. 
   Once the names were corrected, it was possible to identify the properties 
which still had the same owner six months after their sheriff’s sale, theoretically 
signifying that a home had been redeemed.  Since the county parcel data comes 
out every quarter, foreclosed homes were also divided into four groups based on 
the time of the year sheriff’s sale occurred.  Foreclosed properties were then 
compared to parcel data from three quarters in the future, meaning that at least a 
full six months (the time of the redemption period) had passed since the sheriff’s 
sale had occurred for every home.  Since parcel data is released quarterly, it was 
not possible to compare every home’s owner at the exact end of the six month 
redemption period.  For instance, homes foreclosed in the first quarter of 2005 
(January-March) were compared to parcel data from the fourth quarter 2005 
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(released in October 2005).  The results for this analysis revealed that 993 
properties, or nearly 60% of the total foreclosed properties, had been redeemed.  
This immediately raised some concern over the findings, as this number seemed 
too high compared to both what was expected and what people who worked with 
foreclosed homeowners had been saying. 
 Upon contacting the Hennepin County Assessor, the problem was 
determined to be the manner in which the county changes its home ownership 
records.  The ownership of a foreclosed home does not change in the county 
assessor records until the home is bought a by a third party, someone other than 
the original owner or the mortgage lender, after the sheriff’s sale.  Therefore, 
there can be a delay of several months before a change in ownership is seen in the 
assessor’s records if the home is purchased by the original lender at the sheriff’s 
sale, as is often the case.  In an attempt to overcome this problem, owners’ names 
were again compared using parcel data from several different periods – this time 
nine, twelve, fifteen and eighteen months after the sheriff’s sale.  With each 
passing three-month period, the number of homes that were considered 
“redeemed” under the original methodology declined, confirming that the main 
problem with this analysis was the assessor’s methods when recording a change in 
property ownership.   
The final count of “redeemed” homes eighteen months after the sheriff’s 
sale was 296, or almost 18% of the original number of foreclosed homes.  Figure 
2 shows the location of homes that still had the same owner eighteen months after 
the sheriff’s sale.  The pattern generally mirrors the distribution of foreclosed 
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Figure 2. Note: The black outline represents the boundaries of Minneapolis. 
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homes that can be seen in Figure 1, with concentration most apparent in North 
Minneapolis.  This concentration may be because North Minneapolis’ high 
foreclosure rate and poverty discouraged third parties from investing in a 
foreclosed home in that section of the county, meaning that the owner’s name on 
the county records held by the assessor would remain the same.  Despite the 
significant decrease in homes that were considered redeemed, the number still 
appeared too large. 
 In an attempt to compare my initial findings with the observations of 
people and groups that work directly with foreclosed homeowners, I interviewed 
members of three local organizations that were involved with helping foreclosed 
homeowners in the hope of shedding some light as to whether the data that I had 
collected on redemptions were indicative of what was occurring on the ground.  
The three interviewees were Jeff Skrenes (Hawthorne Area Community Council), 
Brandon Nessen (Twin Cities ACORN) and Karen Johnson (Northside Residents 
Redevelopment Council).  While the data that I collected indicated that 
redemptions were fairly common, all of the individuals that I spoke with claimed 
that they had not seen any cases of redemption with homeowners that they had 
worked with.  They all indicated that once a sheriff’s sale had occurred, there was 
little or no chance of a homeowner keeping his or her home.  After these 
discussions, it became apparent that the number of redemptions that occurred was 
likely close to 0%, despite the fact that the research now showed a redemption 
rate of 18%. 
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 Since the previous analysis demonstrated that the number of possible 
redemptions becomes smaller the further in time from the sheriff’s sale, and 
because of the discussions I had with the three homeowner advocacy groups 
indicated that the total number of redemptions was likely to be very small, I 
conducted another analysis one year after my previous analysis. By extending the 
time passed, I hoped that homes that had been bought at the sheriff’s sale by 
banks and lenders would have been resold, leaving only the true redemptions.  
The parcel data I used were from July of 2008.  July 2008 is at least thirty months 
past the sheriff’s sale for all of the foreclosures in 2005, and as much as forty 
months for the homes that were foreclosed in the early part of the year.  This 
difference in time resulted in a significant reduction in the number of homes that 
could be considered redeemed, from 296 (18%) to only 52 (3%) homes.   
 At this point, I began to try to contact the 52 homeowners that I believed 
may have redeemed their home.  I sent 47 of the homeowners a letter explaining 
my research and asking if they would be interested in being interviewed to discuss 
their situation (Appendix 1).  The letter that I sent included a paid return-
addressed envelope as well as my phone and email contact information.  The goal 
of this letter was to introduce homeowners who had potentially redeemed their 
property to my research and ask if they would be willing to further discuss their 
situation with me.  The letter aimed to confirm whether or not my method of 
determining redemptions was correct, by having the residents confirm or deny 
that they had redeemed their property.  I asked each homeowner to indicate 
whether or not he or she was interested in participating in the study, and if so to 
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return the envelope to me with a phone number or email address.  I also included 
the phone number and email address of the college’s Institutional Review Board 
and my advisor’s phone number and email address in case a homeowner had any 
questions that he or she wanted answered before agreeing to participate in the 
study.  I sent the letters to the addresses as they were listed in the county parcel 
data.  The letters were sent out on Thursday, October 30, 2008. 
 I received only three responses.  All three homeowners had indeed 
redeemed their home.  Although they all initially agreed to take part in the study, I 
was able to conduct interviews with only two of the homeowners.  The third 
homeowner was non-responsive to my attempts to contact her, and I was unable 
to set up any type of interview.  I allowed the homeowner to pick the venue for 
the interview in an attempt to make them as comfortable as possible.  Of the two 
interviews that I conducted, one was done over the phone and one was done in 
person in a restaurant. Both homeowners answered all questions asked of them 
and were fully cooperative.  For a list of interview questions please see  
Appendix 3. 
 I also received back fourteen letters that could not be delivered.  These 
letters either stated that the home was vacant or that the postal service could not 
find the correct address.  This issue will be discussed later on in the paper. 
 
Methodological Limitations 
 There is no perfect way in which to determine home redemptions.  Since 
no research of this type had been attempted before, I created my own set of 
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methods to discover the number of redemptions that had occurred.  Although the 
methods that were used were sound and have led us to important data on 
redemptions, there are some methodological issues that should be acknowledged.  
The largest problem with the methodology relates to the ambiguity of the data 
collected from the Hennepin County Assessors.  Since the assessor’s office only 
records a change in ownership in its records when a new owner has purchased a 
foreclosed property, it is difficult to tell when a redemption has occurred.  This 
ambiguity means that we must simply wait and compare the previous owners with 
the current owners over a longer period of time in order to find who might have 
redeemed their home.  We are never able to say with complete certainty that a 
person has redeemed his or her home from looking at these data; the only way of 
confirming a redemption is through contacting homeowners that the data show 
may have redeemed their home.  This is problematic because so few homeowners 
are willing to participate in such a study.   
A large proportion, 14 out of 47 or about 30%, of the letters that I sent out 
in cases of possible redemption were returned to me by the post office because 
they were unable to be delivered; most of the addresses to which these letters had 
been sent were either vacant or could not be located by the post office.  This 
raises questions about the accuracy of county assessor information if many of the 
listed addresses could not be found.  There were thirty letters that I sent out from 
which I received no type of closure; these were letters that I sent out and did not 
receive back in the mail or receive any type of communication from the 
homeowner.  Since they were not returned to me by the postal service, I assume 
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they were correctly delivered to the address where I sent them but that the 
homeowner did not wish to participate in the study.    
There are many potential reasons why homeowners were unwilling to 
participate in the study.  A foreclosure can be an embarrassing and sensitive issue 
for a homeowner, and many may have been unwilling to discuss personal 
financial matters with a researcher.  There is also the possibility that some 
residents who had redeemed their home had moved, and were no longer living in 
the same residence, despite what the parcel data indicated.  Conversely, the parcel 
data may be inaccurate, and the home is still owned by the lender.  In such a case, 
the home would be occupied by another person, or could still be vacant.  Finally, 
it is possible that the homeowner was too busy, forgot about the letter or had no 
desire to participate in this study.  The difficulty in contacting individual 
homeowners to confirm each redemption means that this research is able to show 
patterns of redemption, but cannot be completely accurate.  
 In addition to the difficulty in determining when homeowners have 
redeemed their property, the methodology also has the potential to miss some 
redemptions in the total count.  It is possible that an individual was able to redeem 
their home after six months, but then wanted to sell or was forced to sell the home 
several months later.  However, this type of event would go unnoticed and would 
appear to be just another foreclosed home that had finally been sold to a third 
party; this group of possible redemptions cannot be uncovered using this 
methodology.  While this is a drawback of the methodology, it should be 
emphasized that it is likely that only a small or non-existent percentage of 
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homeowners would redeem their home and then sell it quickly.  To redeem a 
home, the owner must pay a large sum of money, which would be a considerable 
investment.  It would be unlikely that someone would make such a large 
investment and then turn around and quickly sell the home.  The only redemptions 
that will be captured using this methodology are cases where the property owner 
redeems his or her home and then keeps the home for an extended period of time, 
in this case until at least July of 2008.  The basic problem when trying to count 
redemptions is that there is no set point in time when we can state with certainty 
that a home has either been redeemed or not been redeemed. 
 The need to wait for several years before a more reliable redemption count 
can be made leads to a severe disadvantage in counting the number of 
redemptions for lower-and middle-income property owners, because property 
owners with lower incomes are more likely to move from their original home in 
an attempt to upgrade their housing stock.  Although it is impossible to determine 
how many redemptions were missed, the methodological limitations must be 
acknowledged in order to qualify the results. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 By the best estimates of this research, there were 52 homeowners out of a 
possible 1,680 foreclosed homes in 2005 who redeemed their homes.  This means 
that just over three percent of foreclosed homes were redeemed. This is 
significantly lower than the initial investigation into home redemption, which put 
redemption rates at around 60%.  Although, the three percent redemption rate 
represents an estimate that is unlikely to be too low, it may be too high; this 
reflects the methodological problems mentioned earlier that make it impossible to 
confirm a redemption without talking to each individual homeowner.  While a 
few redemptions may have been missed using these methods, it is likely that the 
number of homes that were counted as redeemed but were in fact not redeemed is 
greater than those redemptions that were missed.  This can be inferred from the 
number of letters that were sent out to homes that appeared to have been 
redeemed, but were returned to me by the postal service.  Several of these 
fourteen letters came back explicitly stating that the home was vacant, while 
others stated only that the letter could not be delivered.  Either way, this suggests 
that the redemption count of 52 is more likely to be too high than too low.  Of the 
letters that were sent out, only three homeowners confirmed their redemption, 
while there were no responses stating that a redemption had not occurred.   
Figure 3 shows the distribution of individual redemptions within Hennepin 
County, and Figure 4 shows the distribution by census tract.  While the 
redemption sites are fairly well distributed throughout the county, there are some 
noticeable spatial patterns.  Twenty five of the redemptions (48.1% of the county 
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total) are located within Minneapolis.  While this is a large percentage of total 
redemptions, the redemption rate for foreclosed homes in the city is only 2.9%, 
slightly below the county-wide average of 3.1%.  In North Minneapolis, where 
foreclosures have been more numerous, there were only eleven home redemptions 
out of 490 foreclosures, a redemption rate of only 2.2%.  This is disheartening 
since North Minneapolis has been the focus of foreclosure aid programs in the 
Twin Cities.  The same rate occurred in the northern suburbs (Brooklyn Park, 
Brooklyn Center, Robbinsdale, Crystal, New Hope), which experienced a total of 
317 foreclosures and only seven redemptions.  The northern suburbs represent the 
type of post-World War II suburbs that are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
decline and blight as they age (Lee 2005).  Sitting adjacent to North Minneapolis, 
they possess many of the same problems as the central city while lacking many of 
the situational advantages, such as transportation connectivity and proximity to 
jobs that North Minneapolis possesses.  
At the other end of the spectrum are parts of Hennepin County that had a 
higher than average redemption rate.  The southern inner-ring suburbs – St. Louis 
Park, Edina, Richfield and Bloomington – have considerably higher redemption 
rates.  These cities also had fewer foreclosures than Minneapolis and the northern 
suburbs.  The redemption rate in these four cities is 3.6%, better than the county-
wide average.  Even more pronounced is the redemption rate in the affluent 
suburbs in the western part of the county around Lake Minnetonka.  These towns 
– Minnetonka, Shorewood, Deephaven, Woodland, Wayzata, Orono, Mound, 
Minnetrista, Tonka Bay and Hopkins – represent only 6.4% of total foreclosures, 
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Figure 3: Location of Home Redemptions with Hennepin County. 
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Figure 4: Location of Home Redemptions with Hennepin County.  The black 
outline is the city boundaries of Minneapolis. 
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but account for 17.3% of all redemptions.  The redemption rate of 8.4% is more 
than two and a half times the county average.  While these numbers are not 
necessarily surprising since these towns are amongst the wealthiest in the county, 
it still bears emphasizing that an area with so few foreclosures accounted for so 
many redemptions. 
The clear pattern is that redemptions are more likely to occur in areas that 
are disproportionately high income and white.  Figures 5 and 6 show redemptions 
compared to median income by census tract and percentage white by census tract, 
respectively.  Although there is some clustering of redemptions in low-income 
and minority-majority census tracts, it should be recalled that these census tracts 
had far higher counts of foreclosures.  When the number of initial foreclosures is 
factored in, the data show that census tracts where there is a high percentage of 
whites and where there is a high median income are more likely to contain a 
redemption.  This is supported by a correlation test that was conducted using only 
the census tracts that contained at least one redeemed home.  The test shows that 
the percentage white and the median income of a census tract are significantly 
correlated to the likelihood of a redemption.  Additionally, higher median home 
value, a higher percentage of residents with at least a bachelor’s degree, a higher 
percentage of English speakers and older homeowners are also significantly 
correlated with redemptions. 
While those data only show correlation between the above-mentioned 
factors and home redemption, the strength of these correlations suggests that low-
income and minority homeowners are much less likely to complete a redemption.   
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Redemptions Analysis  
 
 
 
Correlation Analysis Results 
 
*Significant at 0.1  **Significant at 0.01        n=46 
 
Correlated with redemption rates of census tracts. All data at the census tract 
level.  Only census tracts that contained a redemption were compared. 
 Foreclosures 
Percentage 
of Total 
Foreclosure Redemptions 
Percentage 
of Total 
Redemptions 
Percent of 
Foreclosure  
Redeemed 
Hennepin 
County 1680 100.0% 52 100.0% 3.1% 
Minneapolis 861 51.3% 25 48.1% 2.9% 
North 
Minneapolis 490 29.2% 11 21.2% 2.2% 
Northern 
Suburbs  317 18.9% 7 13.5% 2.2% 
Southern 
Suburbs  168 10.0% 6 11.5% 3.6% 
Affluent 
Suburbs  107 6.4% 9 17.3% 8.4% 
 Correlation 
Percentage White ** 0.45 
Percentage Hispanic -0.18 
Income ** 0.54 
Homeowners Age Below 45 * -0.19 
Percent English Speaker ** 0.36 
Median Home Value ** 0.57 
Percentage with at least a Bachelor’s 
Degree 
0.59 
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While those data only show correlation between the above-mentioned factors and 
home redemption, the strength of these correlations suggests that low-income and 
minority homeowners are much less likely to complete a redemption.  The data 
overwhelmingly support this hypothesis, and it makes logical sense, particularly 
when looking at redemption and wealth.  Wealthy homeowners are more likely to 
have the large sums of money saved up that are needed to complete a redemption. 
When looking at redemption and race, it is important to note the correlations 
between race and income level in Hennepin County: the pattern of low-income 
census tracts and census tracts with high percentages of minority populations are 
similar.  This pattern indicates that minorities in Hennepin County also have a 
high likelihood of having a low income. 
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Figure 5: Location of Home Redemptions with Hennepin County compared to 
median income by census tract.  The black outline is the city boundaries of 
Minneapolis.
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Figure 6: Location of Home Redemptions with Hennepin County compared to 
percentage white by census tract.  The black outline is the city boundaries of 
Minneapolis. 
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Statistical Analysis  
 The GIS data that were acquired from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s 
Office and the Metropolitan Council also came with other types of basic 
information on the homes.  Some of this information was examined statistically to 
determine if there were any patterns evident amongst the redeemed homes 
compared to county-wide data on foreclosed homes and the general housing 
stock.  The first variable examined was the average estimated market value (from 
July 2008 parcel data) of the property (both the value of the land and buildings on 
the property).  Not surprisingly, homes that were redeemed had a lower median 
value ($206,950) than the county average ($230,700).  However, redeemed homes 
had a significantly higher median value than the all foreclosed homes in Hennepin 
County ($133,750).  This pattern was the same when calculating the mean home 
value, with redeemed homes ($228,030) falling between the county average 
($348,362) and the average for foreclosed homes ($125,615).  This pattern further 
confirms that redemptions are more likely to occur for wealthier homeowners.   
 The next variable analyzed was the last sale value of the home before it 
went into foreclosure.  This reflects the market value of the home when it was 
purchased by the homeowner who experienced foreclosure, as opposed to the 
market value of the home now.  Both the mean ($158,362) and the median 
($120,000) of the last sale value were higher for redeemed homes than for all of 
the foreclosed homes in the county ($103,530 and $81,900 respectively).  
Interestingly, the median last sale value was higher for redeemed homes than it 
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was for all homes in the county ($112,900), although the county-wide mean 
($190,309) was still higher than the mean value for redeemed homes.   
 The age of the home was also examined to determine if there was any 
pattern between home age and redemption.  Home age in Hennepin County is 
closely connected to physical location, since older homes were generally built 
closer to downtown Minneapolis, while newer homes are generally located in 
newer outer-ring suburbs.  The median construction year for the entire county is 
1960, while the median age of home redemptions is only slightly older, being 
built in 1955.  However the average age of foreclosed homes was significantly 
higher, with a median year built of 1920.  This indicates that redeemed homes are 
more likely to be located further away from Minneapolis than the average 
foreclosed home. 
 
Interviews with Homeowners 
 I attempted to contact 47 of the homeowners who I believed had redeemed 
their homes in order to confirm my estimates.  Of the three responses that I 
received, all three homeowners confirmed that they had indeed redeemed their 
house.  One of these homeowners was located in the northern suburbs, one in the 
wealthy western suburbs, and one in the southwestern part of Minneapolis, which 
is a generally affluent part of the city.  I was able to speak in depth with two of 
these homeowners.  These interviews gave me some insight as to what happens at 
a personal level during a home redemption. 
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 Perhaps the most important aspect that arose during each of my 
discussions with homeowners was the unusual circumstances that resulted in the 
initial foreclosure.  In two of the three redemptions, the homeowner was forced 
into foreclosure after a divorce.  One homeowner had lost his home in the divorce 
settlement, but still had his name legally attached to the deed.  The homeowner 
received a call in June of 2005 from the lender explaining that his ex-wife had not 
paid the mortgage bill in five months and that he owed $6,000, even though his 
name was not on the mortgage.  The home was sold at a sheriff’s sale in late July 
to a mortgage company in Eden Prairie for the same price ($105,000) at which it 
was originally purchased.  In order to redeem the home, the homeowner had to 
pay off the price of the home as well as another mortgage taken out by his ex-
wife, resulting in a total cost of $142,000.  The homeowner took out a new 
mortgage, in effect re-purchasing the house.  He also hired a lawyer in an attempt 
to avoid paying the extra $37,000 that resulted from his wife’s second mortgage, 
but lost the trial.  Another homeowner who confirmed redeeming her home but 
whom I could not contact for a full interview also stated that she had redeemed 
her home by herself after a divorce.  While it is impossible to state with certainty 
that this trend extends beyond these few cases, the prevalence of divorce justifies 
further analysis of the legal and financial connections between divorce and home 
foreclosure. 
 The final confirmed redemption occurred when the homeowner was 
forced to refinance her home.  The homeowner’s loan payments had increased 
significantly because she had originally agreed to an adjustable rate mortgage.  As 
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payments got too high, she decided to refinance.  What occurred next is not 
completely clear.  The homeowner had placed a significant amount of trust in her 
lender, and taken a “hands off” approach in the process.  Although the 
homeowner mentioned switching lenders, she claims that she never took out a 
second mortgage and only refinanced her first mortgage.  However, during the 
refinancing, some documents were not filled out properly.  The homeowner then 
had to cancel the mortgage contract during the three-day right of recession period.  
During this three-day period, the home went into foreclosure.  However, the home 
was immediately redeemed, and the homeowner stated that the sheriff’s sale was 
a formality. She was adamant that the home was never in danger of being lost, 
although it is difficult to know if this is true.  No legal aid was hired by the 
homeowner.  Unfortunately, the new mortgage agreement that the homeowner 
signed was also an adjustable rate mortgage, and the homeowner once again 
seems to be getting into trouble because of the current economic crisis. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
 The current parcel data from Hennepin County leave something to be 
desired: the data are very ambiguous as to who owns a home after a sheriff’s sale, 
and often the true owner of the home is not revealed for months or even years 
after the sale.  The current system, which does not record a change in ownership 
of the home until it is bought by someone other than the original owner or the 
lender, leads to confusion when trying to determine the redemption count.  If the 
county were to change its system so that the purchaser of the home at a sheriff’s 
sale was recorded as the owner, even if the purchaser was a mortgage lender, it 
would allow faster and more reliable counts on the number of redemptions, as 
well as keeping a more correct count of who owns a property for other purposes.  
Redemption counts under such a system would be more accurate and lead to more 
concrete conclusions about who was able to redeem a home and what patterns 
emerge.  
Additionally, the foreclosure process could be changed in order to give the 
sheriff’s sale more closure.  University of Minnesota professor Prentiss Cox has 
recommended changing the redemption period to a “reinstatement period” before 
the sheriff’s sale, which would allow homeowners more time and options to save 
their home (Butcha 2007).  The hope is that by creating a foreclosure process with 
a definitive end at the sheriff’s sale, private investors will be more likely to 
purchase a home at a sheriff’s sale, leading to fewer vacancies and greater 
neighborhood stability. 
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While the exact number of redemptions may remain unknown, I am able 
to make several conclusions based upon the data and results.  Most importantly, I 
can state with high certainty that redemption does not help most foreclosed 
homeowners keep their houses.  In addition to helping only a few homeowners, 
redemption is more likely to help white and wealthy homeowners rather than low-
income and minority homeowners, the groups that are most exposed to 
foreclosure.  Therefore, redemption is providing the least amount of help to the 
demographic groups that need it most.   Since redemption aids a relatively low 
number of foreclosed homeowners, it also has a negligible effect on neighborhood 
stabilization.  Local governments therefore need to look at other possible methods 
to halt the effects of foreclosure on neighborhoods.  One method which has been 
applied in several jurisdictions across the country, most notably Chicago, is 
giving residents a further grace period before they are evicted by the sheriff’s 
department.  This allows residents to continue to occupy their homes, and 
decreases the number of vacant homes and the problems associated with vacant 
homes. 
 The primary reason that redemption helps so few people is because it 
occurs so late in the foreclosure process.  Most homeowners who are serious 
about saving their home – regardless of race, wealth or any other demographic 
factor – will do so earlier in the foreclosure process.   At this time homeowners 
can negotiate with lenders for a better rate.  They also have the added benefit of 
advice and support from homeowner advocacy and neighborhood groups.  
However, these groups are generally uninterested in redemption, so homeowners 
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are forced to go it alone.  These groups believe that a homeowner who has not 
gotten out of trouble by the sheriff’s sale cannot be helped and that the 
redemption period is too late to save a home.  Instead of working with 
homeowners during the redemption period, these groups focus their time and 
energy elsewhere.  The nature of redemptions also makes them more difficult, 
since they require a large sum of money at once.  A foreclosed homeowner trying 
to redeem his or her house is unlikely to have the credit history necessary to 
afford a new mortgage, nor are they likely to have enough money saved up to buy 
the house without such a mortgage. 
 Along with the difficulty of securing a redemption, it appears that 
homeowners also have difficulty staying in their home after it has been redeemed.  
A redemption does not automatically lead to a happy ending for the homeowner.  
Without proper guidance, homeowners who redeemed their homes are likely to 
make many of the same mistakes that they made on their first foreclosure.  One of 
the homeowners whom I interviewed seems to be on a path towards another 
foreclosure, which would nullify the extra work and expenses that went toward 
the redemption.  Unless redeemed homeowners learn from their mistakes, there is 
little reason to believe that they will avoid a second foreclosure.  In order to avoid 
this, homeownership and neighborhood groups should reach out to recently 
redeemed homeowners to provide them with counseling.  It would be a shame for 
a homeowner to go through the legal hassle and stress of a redemption and then to 
lose their house anyway.  Homeownership and neighborhood groups should put as 
much effort into keeping redeemed homeowners in their homes as they do in 
55 
 
aiding foreclosed homeowners. Since there are so few redeemed homeowners, it 
would require only a little additional work, but could result in helping some 
homeowners stay in their homes. 
 Although redemptions are rare, they should not be completely ignored 
since they can help a small group of homeowners.  Instead of leaving 
homeowners to fend for themselves after the sheriff’s sale, advocacy groups could 
target older and wealthy homeowners for redemption, because these groups are 
more likely to have the necessary money saved up.  If those groups who are most 
likely to use the redemption period are made aware of it, redemptions may be able 
to save a few homes.  While redemption will never be useful to the majority of 
foreclosed homeowners, it can still help a select few. 
 The connection between redemption and divorce is something that also 
proved to be particularly interesting.  Although my sample size is too small to 
draw any concrete conclusions, the fact that two out of the three confirmed 
redemptions that I encountered involved a divorce is worth noting.  The problem 
appears to be a legal ambiguity over homeownership and the mortgage after 
divorce.  This topic should be studied further in order to determine the connection 
between divorce and redemption, as well as to decide if any changes need to be 
made in the divorce process in order to avoid preventable foreclosures. 
While this research has focused on the likelihood of redemption, it should 
also be noted that redemption is multi-faceted.  Although its original goal may be 
to provide homeowners with a final chance to keep their homes, redemption also 
provides homeowners with a valuable period of time to get their bearings and 
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shift from being a homeowner to a renter.  During this time, they can save up 
money and figure out where they are going to live, instead of being kicked out 
onto the street after the sale of their home. 
 Although redemptions help only a small number of homeowners, the 
redemption period is still valuable: it provides a last-ditch effort for some 
homeowners to keep their home.  In order for the redemption period to be most 
effective, more people need to be made aware that it exists.  This can be done 
mostly through non-governmental groups making those homeowners who might 
be able to complete a redemption aware that there is a chance to keep their home 
even after the sheriff’s sale.  Doing this may save a small number of additional 
homes each year.   Redemption is not intended to save a large number of 
foreclosure homes, but what it can do is provide a chance for a few homeowners 
to keep their houses while giving other homeowners some breathing space before 
they become renters. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1- Letter Sent to Homeowners  
 
Dear (resident’s name),  
 
My name is Michael Samuelson and I am a senior at Macalester College in St. Paul, 
Minnesota.  I am conducting research under Professor Laura Smith of the Geography 
Department on foreclosure, specifically redemption within the foreclosure process, in 
Hennepin County.  In the scope of this research, redemption refers to a homeowner 
who had his or her home sold at the sheriff’s sale but then was able to keep the 
residence by paying off the home’s debts.  The goal of my research is to be able to 
determine why some homeowners are able to redeem their homes, and then to make 
some policy recommendations to local officials.  You have been chosen to be 
interviewed because of county records which indicate that you may have redeemed 
your house. 
 
The interview will first attempt to verify information that has been collected from 
public data.  The rest of the interview will focus on how you were able to keep your 
home even after it was foreclosed upon; I would like you to tell your story. 
Please be assured that your responses will be held strictly confidential.  All 
information collected in this interview will be used strictly for the research project.  
You will not be identified in any report, publication or presentation that results from 
this research. 
 
Please know that your participation in this study is entirely your choice.  You may end 
or withdraw your participation at any time if you feel uncomfortable, and you may 
skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
If you have any questions or concerns at anytime please feel free to contact myself 
(301-801-1980/msamuelson@macalester.edu) or Professor Smith (651-696-
6505/smithl@macalester.edu) at the contacts listed below.  Additionally, if you would 
like to discuss the research with someone not involved with the interview, you are 
encouraged to contact the Macalester College Institutional Review Board at 1600 
Grand Ave, Saint Paul MN 55105 or phone at 651-696 6153. 
If you are interested in learning more about participating in an interview, please return 
this form in the envelope provided or send me an email. Additionally, if you are 
interested in being interviewed, please provide a phone number or email address where 
I can contact you. Thank you for your time. 
 
All the Best, 
Michael Samuelson 
 
Name: ____________________________ 
 
I wish to learn more about the interview process _____ 
 
Phone number and/or email address 
___________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2-Consent Form for Interview 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Examining Home Redemption in Hennepin County 
Please review the following material that explains the purpose of this research 
project.  This should help you decide whether or not you want to participate in the 
study. Signing the form will indicate that you have been informed about the study 
and that you want to participate. 
You are being asked to take part in a research project being conducted by Michael 
Samuelson, a student at Macalester College, for his Senior Honors Project.  The 
project is under the direction of Macalester College Professor Laura Smith of the 
Geography Department. If you have any questions regarding this project that you 
would like to ask of someone other than the interviewer, Professor Smith can be 
reached at (651) 696-6505 or smithl@macalester.edu. 
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND INTENT OF THE PROJECT 
The project focuses on the current foreclosures that are occurring in Hennepin 
County.  Specifically, the project is looking at homeowners who were able to 
redeem their home after it was foreclosed upon and sold by the county sheriff. In 
the scope of this research, redemption refers to a homeowner who had his or her 
home sold at the sheriff’s sale but then was able to keep the residence by paying 
off the home’s debts.  You have been chosen to be interviewed because of county 
records which indicate that you may have redeemed your house.  The goal of this 
research is to be able to determine why some homeowners are able to redeem 
their homes, and then to make some policy recommendations to local officials. 
The interview will first attempt to verify information that has been collected from 
public data.  This will include information on when you bought your home, when 
it was foreclosed upon and where you received you mortgage.  The rest of the 
interview will focus on how you were able to keep your home even after it was 
foreclosed upon; I would like you to tell your story. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Please be assured that your responses will be held strictly confidential.  All 
information collected in this interview will be used strictly for the research 
project.  You will not be identified in any report, publication or presentation that 
results from this research.  Your responses will only be viewed by Michael 
Samuelson (interviewer) and Professor Smith. 
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VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Please know that your participation in this study is entirely your choice.  Feel free 
to skip any question that you are uncomfortable with.  You may end or withdraw 
your participation at any time if you feel uncomfortable. 
QUESTIONS? 
Feel free to ask any questions you have at any time before, during or after the 
interview.  If you have any questions or concerns at anytime, and would like to 
discuss them with someone not involved with the interview, you are encouraged 
to contact the Macalester College Institutional Review Board at 1600 Grand Ave, 
Saint Paul MN 55105 or phone at 651-696 6153. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read this paper about the study or it was read to me.  I have asked any 
questions that I have and have received answers to these questions.  I consent to 
participate in the study. 
Signature of Participant ______________________________        Date 
_____________ 
I agree to participate ___________Yes           _____________No 
Signature of Researcher ______________________________ Date 
_____________ 
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Appendix 3-Interview Question Form 
 
1. What is your current address and how long have you lived there? 
2. Was this addressed foreclosed on in 2005 and sold by the county sheriff 
on [date that I have listed from the sheriff’s department]? 
3. To whom was it sold? 
4. How did you go about reacquiring the house?  
5. Was the person who bought the house from the sheriff helpful when you 
tried to reacquire the home? 
6. Were you aided by any third party? 
7. Did you take out any further loans?  From who? 
8. What is the current financial status of this home? 
9. What is your household income?   
10. What percent of your income do you use to pay for you mortgage? 
11. How would you classify your race? 
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